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AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND VALUATION. By Clarence Irving 
Lewis.' Paul Carus Lectures, Seventh Series, I945. LaSalle, Illi- 
nois: The Open Court Publishing Company. I946. pp. xxi, 567. 
$6.oo. 
Most of our judges and law professors spend a large part of their lives 
justifying or criticizing various human arrangements known as legal 
rules or decisions, and yet when the circuit of their tasks is interrupted 
by an inquiry into just what it is that they are doing when they justify 
or criticize, they are apt to react with more heat than light. For the 
intellectual fashion of our times requires them to hold that justification 
and criticism are matters of personal emotion and uncertainty, while the 
dictates of their profession require them also to maintain that what they 
are doing has a firm basis in certain and objective truth. 
Faced with the modern version of Samson's riddle - how to draw 
the honey of objective certainty from the lions of passion and emotion 
our jurists have offered three divergent answers, none of which can 
command much respect. Some have denied that there can be any cer- 
tainty or objectivity in law, but the most energetic of these, upon don- 
ning judicial robes, has had to profess an appeal to something more than 
the uncertainties of his own subjective emotions when he has reversed the 
decision of a lower court. At the other extreme, there are a few judges 
and law teachers who, under the influence of Thomism, Marxism, or 
some other absolutistic metaphysics, insist that the certainties of law are 
properly derivable from the certainties of morality. But the great ma- 
jority of those who write professorial texts or judicial opinions try to 
save the certainty of law and the uncertainty of ethics by denying that 
law and ethics have any necessary connection with one another. 
Out of this effort to separate law from the secret juices that give it 
life there has sprung a maze of pseudo-logics, crypto-rationalisms, and 
nominalistic positivisms that have in common only a common sterility. 
Law is given protection from contamination by human needs through 
the age-old method of discreet nomenclature. The facts one dislikes are 
called theories; the theories one cherishes are dubbed facts. Law must 
retain its integrity by steering clear of social "theory." Many years ago 
Holmes wrote of this attitude: 
Perhaps one of the reasons why judges do not like to discuss questions of 
policy, or to put a decision in terms upon their views as law-makers, is that 
the moment you leave the path of merely logical deduction you lose the illu- 
sion of certainty which makes legal reasoning seem like mathematics. But the 
certainty is only an illusion, nevertheless.2 
Professor Lewis' latest book addresses itself to the basic question of 
how the objective certainty that we demand of justice can be derived 
from the emotional vagaries of subjective valuations. The answer given 
Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University. 
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to this question marches for 362 pages through preliminary considera- 
tions of logic and epistemology before it comes to grips with the problem 
of values; the last i90 pages are devoted to a closely reasoned analysis 
of this problem. The volume embodies a large part of the life work of a 
distinguished teacher and a patient thinker and is so written that a 
patient reader would have to devote proportional time and effort to an 
adequate understanding and fair appraisal of the work. Yet if Holmes, 
who thought that Kant should have been able to explain his main ideas 
to a young lady in ten minutes after dinner,3 had made a similar demand 
upon Lewis, it seems to me that he might have responded in something 
like these words: 
Subjectivism in ethics, the notion that normative statements are of 
merely emotive significance, is a pathological development arising out 
of misunderstanding of modern science. This sickness of contemporary 
thought can be cured by recognition that there is a subjective element 
in value judgments, but in exactly the same way there is a subjective 
element in judgments of heat, cold, light, color, weight, pressure, and 
everything else that is the object of human experience. No scientific 
statement would have any meaning if it could not be tested by such 
subjective personal experiences as our experiences of color, pressure, etc. 
Indeed, the meaning of any scientific statement consists essentially of 
the summarization or prediction of such experiences, past, present, and 
future, actual, probable, and possible. What saves science from being a 
planless succession of daydreams is that there are connections among 
our own and other people's subjective experiences which are not always 
too abstruse for human understanding. Consequently, men, or at least 
some men, are able to think about, anticipate, and make conscious use of 
a world beyond the egocentric here-and-now. Such understanding and 
manipulation go beyond merely subjective impressions, in ethics as in 
other fields of knowledge. Thus, "evaluations of things are objective and 
cognitive, and are not relative to particular persons or circumstances or 
occasions in any fashion which differentiates them from attributions of 
other properties to objects" (p. 458). 
All this, Lewis would say, is very far from the transcendentalist posi- 
tion that ethical truth is independent of subjective experience. But 
ethical truth may be dependent upon subjective factors without being 
identical with them. For whenever we go beyond the immediacy of felt 
experience to think or say anything about it we run the risk of error. 
And this is as true of values as of colors or weights. "At least half of 
the world's avoidable troubles are created by those who do not know 
what they want and pursue what would not satisfy them if they had 
it" (pp. 372-73). However, although the subjective element is necessary 
in all knowledge, knowledge is more than immediate perception. Knowl- 
edge is, for Lewis, a part of life and therefore a part of human action. 
Even such knowledge as cannot be refuted by any experience we may 
ever have - for example, our knowledge of laws of logical or mathe- 
matical inference, or our knowledge that gold is metallic, or that men 
' Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 22 (F. S. Cohen ed. I948). 
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are able, under certain conditions, to think - always involves a subjec- 
tive element in that such "analytic truth" is a function of our own defi- 
nitions, and one may attach to words "any self-consistent signification 
that one may choose" (p. I6). If we define gold as a certain metal, then 
we know in advance that whenever and wherever gold may be found we 
shall find a metal, and no fact could persuade us of the contrary; so, 
with the a priori truths of logic. In short, even the most impersonal and 
objective statements we can make involve a subjective element. 
Subjectivists in ethics go wrong, Lewis thinks, in not taking their 
subjectivism seriously enough, in using it, perhaps, only as a weapon 
against moral ideas which are in conflict with their own secret moral 
beliefs. If they took their subjectivism seriously, and applied it sys- 
tematically to all fields of experience, they would find man's "egocentric 
predicament" (to use Perry's phrase) all-pervasive. Being all-pervasive, 
it cannot serve as an excuse for separating the uncertainties of ethics from 
the pretended certainties of law, economics, or physics. Life is too 
deeply tinged with the subjective, the uncertain, and the precarious to 
leave any sense in such a separation. 
If this is a fair summary of what Lewis is saying, then he has shown 
that the principle of polarity can make a solid contribution to our think- 
ing about ethical knowledge and knowledge in general. If any substan- 
tial number of our juristic thinkers have the stamina to read through 
the Lewis treatise, we may find in the juristic literature of coming dec- 
ades a less confident reliance upon the subjectivity of morals and the 
objectivity of everything else than we have found in the judicial opinions 
and professorial treatises of the past century. And one may hope that 
in the field of ethics Lewis' volume will stimulate a revival of the effort 
to explore the geography of human enjoyments and sufferings. A useful 
geography of values might do for the law reform of the coming century 
what the work of Bentham did for the century of law reform that he 
initiated. But one must admit that Lewis' book is not likely to have 
such an effect unless the author's colleagues in ethical fields pay more 
respectful attention to his ideas than he has paid to theirs. 
Perhaps it is only the vocational prejudice of an old law review editor 
that would notice the number of times that Lewis advances ideas de- 
veloped by coworkers without giving them credit - Bertrand Russell 
and Morris R. Cohen, who have said most of what Lewis has to say 
about the nature of value and the scientific method, are not mentioned in 
the index. And perhaps it would be captious to criticize Lewis for mis- 
understanding the position taken by some of his opponents; for after 
all, no two philosophers ever quite understand each other. (This re- 
view surely constitutes no exception.) But more serious than any 
failure to mention thinkers he follows or to understand those he attacks 
is the author's failure to take advantage of the work of contemporaries 
who have found ways across barriers that he still regards as insurmount- 
able. 
The chief purpose of this volume is to establish the possibility of sys- 
tematic ethical judgments comparable to the systematic connected judg- 
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ments of natural science. In this task Lewis finds two special difficulties: 
the supposed chasm between the "good" and the "right," and the issue 
of the commensurability of values. As to the former, the work done on 
the basis of modern logic in establishing the interconnection of "good," 
"bad," "right," "wrong," and all other moral categories is overlooked by 
Lewis, who dismisses logical inquiries into this subject as "useless pedan- 
try" (pp. 5II, 55I) - a strange epithet from one of America's top-flight 
logicians, a writer of abstruse tomes who likes to denounce "argument 
by epithet," and who is surely sophisticated enough to see that "useless 
pedantry" is only a dyslogistic equivalent of "priceless teaching." The 
result is that on the last page of his journey Lewis stops at what he 
views as an unbridgeable chasm between goodness or value, which he 
considers "empirical," and rightness or justness, which he leaves in a 
nonempirical realm of complete mystery (p. 554). 
Equally disappointing is Lewis' failure to take account of the work 
of fellow logicians who have shown that the traditional objections to 
quantitative views of happiness or suffering are based upon an invalid 
conception of quantity. One does not need instruments to know that the 
suffering of a concentration camp is greater than the suffering involved 
in the execution of a dozen Nazi murderers, any more than one needs 
instruments to know that there is more nourishment in a pound of roast 
beef than there is in two pounds of lettuce, or that spading and culti- 
vating half an acre involves more work than picking melons therefrom. 
Without such sensible recognition of "more" and "less" in our experi- 
ence - which is basic to Lewis' view of knowledge - none of our for- 
mulas or instruments for measurement would make sense. Of course, 
measurement of more and less involves an element of convention, but 
this is as true of calories in dietetics and of ergs or foot-pounds of work 
in physics as it is of enjoyment or suffering. And, according to Lewis, 
this element of convention is present not only in measurement but in any 
application of any concept to any experience (p. i io). 
For Lewis to give up as hopeless the effort to group and compare 
value experiences (pp. 488-95) -something that he tries very hard to 
validate (pp. 54I-5I) - is truly a pity. Men knew enough to com- 
pare tasks and food values before the necessary logical formulas for the 
process were worked out; otherwise they would not have survived the 
hostile forces and predicaments that nature poses. It does not take a 
superhuman faith to suppose that men can weigh the enjoyments of the 
many against the enjoyments of the few for a few more years or cen- 
turies until our scientists have devised the calories or foot-pounds or 
ergs to measure human suffering and human happiness in more exact 
and refined ways than those of common sense. As a wise French jurist 
has said, it is not necessary to throw to the dogs all that is not fit for 
the altars of the gods. 
Despite these curable lapses in Lewis' effort to establish the possibility 
of systematically interconnected ethical observations and judgments, the 
argument of the volume moves with an irresistible pachydermal 
force. Myriads of actual or possible objections or misunderstandings are 
always being pushed out of the path of the argument. Indeed from a 
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philosophical, as well as a literary, point of view, it may be said that 
Lewis overargues his case. Surely it is not necessary to argue that 
"knowing is for the sake of doing" (p. 3) - a view which most wise 
men in the East and many wise men since Aristotle in the West have 
found it possible to reject - in order to establish the fact, which is 
central to Lewis' main thesis, that empirical knowledge is always rele- 
vant to doing and is either confirmable or disprovable by experience, 
and that intellectual construction -whether of statutes or of rules and 
concepts of natural science - involves constructing as well as constru- 
ing. In this sense, at least, action is an essential part of understanding, 
whether the understanding be directed to cabbages or to kings. 
The demonstration that we do not suddenly move from an objective 
world to a subjective world when we move from the appraisal of cab- 
bages to the appraisal of kings is one of the outstanding demonstrations 
of a philosophy that has digested the meaning of modern logic and opera- 
tional method. To that logic and method no living American philoso- 
pher has made larger contributions than has Professor Lewis. His Mind 
and the World Order is one of the great philosophical books of the cen- 
tury. The present treatise is a worthy sequel to that work. 
FELIX S. COHEN.* 
THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL. By Neil W. 
Chamberlain.' New York: Harper & Brothers. I948. Pp. x, 338. 
$4.50. 
The growth of large-scale, pervasive trade unionism with its accom- 
panying challenge to managerial control marks one of the fundamental 
shifts in power during a period already shaken with multiple shifts in 
power. Professor Chamberlain examines this shift now evolving at the 
very core of industry -large-scale corporate enterprise -to discover 
whether the necessary transition can be made planfully and peacefully 
within our present institutional framework. He seeks answers to this 
crucial question through the experience of large corporations in six in- 
dustries with the unions representing their employees. The industries 
upon which study is concentrated are automobile manufacturing, steel 
production, meat packing, public utilities, rubber, and electrical equip- 
ment. Illustrations from varying records in these industries, -and 
others too - from interviews, agreements, grievance procedures, private 
correspondence, arbitrators' decisions, and the like, are scattered through 
the thirteen chapters of the text, and selective summaries of findings in 
the first four industries are presented in appendices. 
The heart of the text itself, however, is something different, some- 
thing neither continuously related to, nor consistently rooted in, the 
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